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Among matters needing revision or explanation are the following:
the second definition of abnormal (p. 9) is a definition of pathologi-
cal; pathopsychology and psychopathology are not necessarily parts
of abnormal psychology (p. 10), they may be its correlates; de-
creased function (hypo- conditions) are not classified with the
absences, increases or perversions (p. 10) but are in a separate
group; reference to neurological literature will show that lesion of
the primary cortical stations in the post-central convolutions is not
accompanied by loss of cutaneous and kinesthetic sensations (p. 24),
but by losses of special sensory abilities; the refusal to accept a dis-
tinction drawn by Esquirol is not a " theory " (p. 26) ; logorrhea
cannot be a verbal hallucination described as "the escape of
thought" (p. 28) and at the same time (p. 97) an " extreme gar-
rulity "; there would appear to be no reason in a psychological text
for an appeal to teleology (p. 43) ; in speaking of paradoxia sexualis
it is meaningless to say that one form is a "premature develop-
ment . . . beyond the age of the child " (p. 38) ; it is pedagog-
ically bad, to say the least, to separate two conditions which are con-
ceded to be alike without defining the supposed differences, as in
speaking of " lower motor neurone" paralyses " and peripheral
paralyses" (p. 89); the use of the description "at rest" (p. 91)
does not define the conditions in an individual who is trying to main-
tain his balance on one foot; the invocation of the concept of mem-
ory loss to account for functional paralyses (p. 92) and for the
aphasias (p. 95) is very questionable and probably gratuitous in
view of the recent publications on the latter subject.
It is advantageous to get the facts clearly presented, and to in-
dicate the possible or probable directions of explanation, but no
good purpose is subserved by including meaningless and ill-formed
statements. The criticisms are offered as additions and corrections;
if space were available more points would be dealt with in the hope
that the next edition will far surpass the second.
SHEPHERD IVORY FEANZ
GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL FOR THE INSANE
HENRY H. GODDARD. Psychology of the Normal and Subnormal.
New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919. Pp. xxiv + 349.
The hypothetical flow of a postulated neurokyme over an im-
aginary neuron pattern is the keynote of explanation in Goddard's
recent book, The Psychology of the Normal and Subnormal. The
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book is written for "those beginning the study of psychology in
Normal Schools and Colleges, teachers who read for themselves,
parents who desire to understand their children." It will be in-
teresting and profitable reading for all these people, but that it can
serve as an introduction to general psychology is not probable, be-
cause it is not systematic, does not cover the whole field of general
psychology, is practically silent on the elementary processes, has too
much space given to inconsistent hypotheses, and shows practically
no knowledge of recent experimentation in general psychology. One
of the most frequent references is to James whose psychology was
elaborated 32 years ago. There are 55 references, about half are
psychological, practically none to original sources in the periodical
literature of psychology.
The book begins with a discussion of the nervous system. The
plates are good and the descriptions clear. But why should there be
such a chapter in a psychology? Until we can know what nervous
processes underlie conscious processes, and can formulate the laws
governing these neural processes, nerve physiology can be of no
service to psychology. It is the business of psychology to discover
and formulate the laws and principles involved in the relations of
stimuli to responses. For practical purposes these relationships are
all we need to know. A college student having difficulty with his
lesson will get no help from figure 18. A father looking for guid-
ance in training his wayward son will get no assistance from
figure 11.
In Chapter I I Goddard discusses reflexes, instincts, perceptions
and ideas. The discussion is in terms of neuron patterns. The re-
flexes and instincts depend upon inherited patterns. The author
seems to accept the idea that consciousness is due to resistance in the
synapse. " May it be," he says, " that two nerve fibers in contact
or in close juxtaposition make manifest the energy otherwise im-
perceptible?" (p. 27). "The consciousness resulting from two or
even twenty neurons is too faint to be consciousness, but when
thousands are involved, it rises above the threshold " (p. 28). " Con-
sciousness, especially in the higher thought processes is in some un-
known way the result of some interference with the free flow of
neurokyme '* (p. 28). Neural interference gives rise to conscious-
ness, the greater the interference, the greater the consciousness.
When we come to Goddard's discussion of attention, we find that
height of attention depends upon ease of flow of the neurokyme
(p- 77)- These two theories are inconsistent. In explaining the
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conflict of stimuli in attention, we find (p. 79) the following:
" There is a ready formed, instinctive pattern to which the stimulus
of a loud noise instantly leads, arousing strong activity with its
accompanying consciousness. But what becomes of the conscious-
ness existent when the loud noise interrupted us? The answer is,
it is eclipsed by the greater consciousness aroused by the stimulus."
Thus, astronomy is brought to the aid of psychology! It has been a
tradition in psychology now for some time to say that consciousness
is due to interference in the flow of neural energy, when the least
reflection or experimentation shows that the richest consciousness is
in connection with inherited neural activity, in which case the flow
must be easy and uninterrupted. In a violent emotion, so strongly
do the processes involved hold the center or focus of consciousness,
that other stimuli for the time can not be effective in arousing focal
consciousness.
In chapters 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10, Goddard treats of memory, im-
agination, association, attention, and other higher processes. In
his treatment of memory, in the main he follows Titchener. His
explanation of the feeling of familiarity (p. 71) can hardly be
satisfactory to the critical reader. We find the useless distinction
between association by contiguity and similarity. On page 95, God-
dard identifies them, but on pages 99 and 101 we find them to be
different again. The author does not seem to see that identity of
experience is the basis of all association.
On page 121, we find all important mental processes reduced to
unity. " There is no possibility of differentiating (imagination,
memory, association, attention) because they are all one and the
same thing . . . only different phases of the same mental
process" (p. 121). One might as well say that because a ball is
both red and round, redness and roundness are one and the same
thing, both being characteristics of the same ball.
In chapters nine and ten, thought and reasoning are discussed.
" Thought appears when neurokyme in a simple neuron pattern is
interrupted under conditions where there are associated neuron
patterns into which that neuron energy may flow and lead to action "
(p. 164). It is difficult to see in what sense " thought" is used. If
consciousness is meant, the quoted statement can hardly be true.
In the summary, p. 173, we read, " perception, judgment and reason-
ing are all phases of the thought process." Can it be that perception
is due to interference ? And can it be that " sensation is the con-
sciousness of a stimulus"? (p. 165).
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The psychology of learning is disposed of in a 14-page chapter
on habit which shows no knowledge of the recent experimentation
in this important field.
In his treatment of emotion, Goddard takes a position essentially
the same as that of James. A situation sets into action various
glands and other internal organs, by means of the sympathetic sys-
tem. This activity sends to the cortex a complex stimulation which
occasions sensations which are the essential part of feeling and
emotion. We are not told whether feeling is another kind of sensa-
tion, whether it is a conscious element correlate with sensation, or
whether it is an attribute of sensation.
One of the most interesting discussions of Part II concerns
mental levels and their determination. In this field the author is at
home and speaks from his large experience. The reader here finds
helpful treatment of moral training, the relation of intelligence to
control of the emotions, the moral imbecile, and various pedagogical
applications of the facts discussed.
W. H. PYLE
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOUHI
DOWNEY, J. E. Graphology and the Psychology of Handwriting.
Baltimore: Warwick & York, 1919. Pp. 142.
Dr. Downey has here summarized in compact form the present
state of theory and experiment in the field of graphology and the
psychology of handwriting. The material is presented in two sec-
tions. The first deals with three topics: (1) the basal concepts of
graphology; (2) graphological methods, and (3) the graphological
elements. The second section discusses some of the author's own
experimental work on (1) the analysis of the factors entering into
disguised handwriting, (2) the influence of mental and physical
condition on handwriting, (3) the comparison of handwriting with
other forms of motor expression, and (4) the comparison of grapho-
logical with character traits. Several of these studies are here pre-
sented for the first time. In the last named study the author dis-
covered several very significant relationships, especially between
small writing and interest in detail (r = -f- .61).
The main purpose of the book, as expressed by the author, " is
one of orientation, preliminary to an attempt to use graphic activity
in tests of temperamental or character traits." On the whole it
serves its purpose well, though the person familiar with the tests.
